



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Intensified Apartheid in South Africa

by Gwendolen M. Carter

On April 16, 1958 Johannes G. Strijdom's National party became the first in South African history to win three successive elections. Moreover, it demonstrated the continued growth of its electoral support by winning 103 out of 156 seats in the House of Assembly, a gain of seven seats over those held previously and, by securing, in a 90 percent turnout of voters, 49.07 percent of the vote as compared to 45.50 percent in 1953.

In contrast to the tentative moves toward racial partnership in the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and steadily increasing African political influence almost everywhere else south of the Sahara, the South African election endorsed white supremacy unshared with the natives. The two minor parties, the Labor party and the Liberal party, which espoused liberal racial policies, not only failed to obtain a seat in the general election but polled less than 6,000 votes between them. The United party itself seems to have been hurt rather than helped by the stand it took at its extraordinary conference in August 1957 in favor of replacing the Cape Colored voters on the common roll from which they had been removed late in 1956 at the end of a six-year constitu-

tional crisis which had caused a deep rift.

The Nationalists not only made capital out of what they termed the United party's "softness" toward the non-whites, but also exerted intense pressure to detach its Afrikaner members. "No Afrikaner can find a home in the United party" was a favorite campaign slogan.

It seems likely also that the triumphant Nationalists will continue the attrition of their opponents, even absorbing those of the English-speaking members of other parties who are willing to conform to the Afrikaner Nationalist pattern. It would be even more dangerous for the United party if the English-speaking minority, which has never been deeply concerned with politics, should increasingly lose interest in active political participation.

Among the Nationalists, events immediately before the election showed the power of their present leaders. The idealistic groups within Nationalist Afrikanerdom, notably in the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and the Dutch Reformed Church, have been urging more support of territorial *apartheid* (racial separation), possibly along the lines suggested by the Tomlinson Commission Report on the Socio-Economic Devel-

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opment of the Reserves. A crushing blow to this effort came when Senator Hendrik Verwoerd resigned as Minister of Native Affairs three weeks before the election as a protest against Nationalist criticisms of his policies, and was reinstated by the Prime Minister. Even if Mr. Strijdom's ill-health should force him to relinquish the party leadership, it appears that Dr. Verwoerd, or someone equally close to Mr. Strijdom, will succeed him. Thus Nationalist policy toward the native reserves seems likely to concentrate on directing the Africans' use of land in those areas rather than on encouraging any radical change in their economic life.

Spread of Apartheid

Within the so-called white areas of the Union, the stress will be laid on implementing the measures of *apartheid* which have already been defined in legislation. Residential segregation is a major goal. The Indian community in Johannesburg is under heavy pressure to move to Lenasia, a new township 18 miles outside the city in which their trading activities have long been carried on. "Black spots" are to be eliminated from white urban areas. Further divisions may be drawn in the sphere of economic activities, which otherwise tend to integrate the white and non-white workers involved in mining and industrial operations. The Native Laws Amendment Act, passed over bitter protests at the last session of Parliament, is an implicit warning against organizational contacts between whites and non-whites, which

could be made an explicit prohibition by ministerial action.

One further measure of *apartheid* may be instituted by the Nationalists as a result of their electoral victory: that is university *apartheid* which would extend governmental control over virtually all African education. Tabled until after the election because of strong opposition from Afrikaans, as well as English-speaking institutions, is legislation to exclude non-whites from Witwatersrand and Cape Town Universities, where a small number now obtain specialized education in the same classrooms as do whites, and to place under a government department both Fort Hare College for non-whites, and the segregated facilities of Natal University, including its Bantu Medical School. The Nationalists, moreover, are already planning three new universities, one for each of the major Bantu language groups, which are similarly to be under government control and without guarantees of academic freedom.

Weakness of Non-whites

Perhaps still more significant for the immediate future of the Union than their electoral success is the victory that the Nationalists won against the non-white organizations which attempted unsuccessfully to organize a stay-away-from-work strike in the week before the election to protest non-white political impotence, and to demand a pound sterling a day minimum wage. Inadequate non-white organization and the police action used by the government pre-

vented the boycott from becoming effective. One result may be that force will be used still more widely in dealing with subsequent signs of African discontent. And since the Africans are not only long-suffering but gain considerable returns from their involvement in the economic activities of the country, they may continue to contribute to its prosperity in the foreseeable future.

Despite the bitter feeling in the emerging West African states against South Africa's racial policies, both sides are making serious efforts to maintain and even extend communications. The Nationalist government recently lifted *apartheid* restrictions for a representative of Ghana who was attending a Cape Town conference, and for the Sultan of Zanzibar. In the long run the inconsistency of treating Africans from outside the country differently from Africans within it may bring some practical modifications in South African color policies. So, too, may the country's dynamic industrial processing enterprises in which more than two-thirds of the semi-skilled workers are already African. But meanwhile the South African electorate has put its stamp of approval on rigorously enforced *apartheid*, with all its danger of cutting the last lines of communication between whites and non-whites and accelerating the polarization of sentiment between them.

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Anglo-American Unity Restored

The recent visit of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to Washington spotlights an important fact: Anglo-American unity is again solid, sound and cordial. This is something of a miracle, considering the animosity, bitterness and division that existed 20 months ago at the time of the Suez crisis.

Two things have brought about this improvement: crises and personalities.

First, the old adage that cemented the American colonies nearly 200 years ago—hang together or hang separately—still holds. Both London and Washington now see more clearly than ever that if there was strength in union then, there is also strength in unity now. The crises around the world which the Russians foster require Anglo-American unity in outlook and a common policy, if they are not to erupt continuously to Moscow's advantage. Unity is not a matter of courtesy. It is an absolute necessity for both countries.

Second, personalities have helped to reconstruct and strengthen the London-Washington axis. Prime Minister Macmillan is that rare combination of urbanity, modesty, ability and acumen which makes the task of winning friends and reaching agreements seem effortless. He and President Eisenhower get along famously, although they are basically different.

But all of this unity, cooperation and understanding between London and Washington should not lead one into assuming that Britain and the United States do not have their disagreements and disputes. It is unthinkable, however, that these matters should ever develop again into another conflict between the United

States and Britain like that over Suez. Mr. Macmillan is not Sir Anthony Eden; and John Foster Dulles can hardly forget the lessons of Suez.

Points of Difference

Their differences are not insuperable, or even serious. The summit meeting, which may now not be held, is an instructive example. The British wanted a meeting more than the Americans. They were even more hopeful that some good might come out of such a parley. But they did not, as Mr. Macmillan made clear, want a summit without preparation or a summit that would only be a spectacle and a propaganda contest. This was in line with Mr. Dulles' views—although Mr. Dulles' idea of what was adequate preparation and those of Mr. Macmillan may have differed.

Then there is the matter of banning nuclear tests. London is not ready to accept any test-ban formula before the United States revises its Atomic Energy Act, making it possible for Britain to get information from this country that it would otherwise have to get from more testing. Washington, for its part, is not ready to accept a nuclear test-ban and a policing system unless there is some way to prevent surprise nuclear attacks. In other words, the British decision about a nuclear test-ban depends on the American Congress, while the American decision depends on Moscow's intentions.

The two countries' differences on trade expansion are due to the role trade plays in their respective economies. Trade is important and valuable to the United States; it is imperative and vital to Britain. Therefore

Britain wants to relax trade regulations with Red China and the Soviet bloc while the United States, for domestic political reasons, is committed to an embargo on Red China trade. This is not an insoluble problem, but one that requires attention, negotiation and mutual understanding.

Part of the difference on trade expansion relates to questions of financing such an increase. Britain believes in doing this through private investment as much as possible, as well as by creation of a new soft-loan international lending institution, such as the one suggested by Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma. Washington agrees with these proposals in theory, but is sceptical about their execution—and much less in a hurry than Britain.

The French political situation also raises certain differences between London and Washington. Both countries hope that General Charles de Gaulle can carry out his plans—that he can rewrite the French constitution and resolve the Algerian problem. But whereas the United States is quite optimistic about France's prospects, London has its doubts. De Gaulle's problems are impressive and formidable. London tends to emphasize, Washington to minimize them.

Basically, however, Washington and London are seeing eye to eye on the crucial issues of the day and, what is more important, striving jointly to resolve them. Neither can admit that the part it played in the Suez fiasco was disastrous, but both would agree that a little hindsight would have helped. Hereafter they want to combine their foresight.

NEAL STANFORD



Future Wars: Nuclear or Limited?

(The New York Times reported on June 8, 1958 that the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying the question whether the United States should prepare for limited war, or all-out nuclear war, or both. Here are two views on the subject—one from the Army, the other from the Air Force.)

IT IS generally accepted that with the power of modern weapons, a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, if waged to its utmost limits, would bring down disaster upon mankind. The growth of nuclear stockpiles, and the development of means for delivering them, have produced a situation in which the deliberate initiation of unlimited hostilities represents an unacceptable course of action for both sides in the prevailing East-West struggle. . . .

With no abatement of the cold war in prospect, and because of the disastrous consequences of an unlimited war, the West is faced with a fateful problem. How can Communist expansion, whether by military or non-military means, be thwarted without incurring unacceptable risks?

In many ways, the problem of forestalling Communist expansion by so-called peaceful political and economic penetration is the most difficult challenge facing the free world. It will require a high degree of ingenuity and skill to outmatch the Soviets in this contest. Fortunately, this is an area where the West possesses unrivaled spiritual and material resources. The principal need is a recognition of the character of the chal-

lenge and a determination to beat the Communists at their own game. . . .

The containment of Communist expansion is important, but it is not a sufficient strategy. Our ultimate objective is a cessation in the cold war itself.

The minimum precondition for inducing the Soviet-bloc nations to abandon the goal of world conquest is the denial of further opportunity for military expansion. With a military equilibrium, there can be some hope that evolutionary changes will occur in the bloc regimes so that they will no longer constitute a threat to free nations.

In the light of these general considerations, the military problem resolves itself down into one fundamental question: How can military power be used as a rational and effective instrument for supporting national policy objectives?

All-out War a Disaster

Only limited war can serve a coherent purpose. An all-out war would be a political disaster—a senseless thing without an object.

Because war is a political act, and must serve a political purpose, the controlling principle in war is the principle of the objective. It is not possible to conceive of any rational purpose that would be served by an unrestricted nuclear war. The most basic United States objective, therefore, is to avert such a disaster.

At the same time the United States recognizes that its own security is bound up with the security of free peoples everywhere. Even the United

Views of the Army

The following article consists of excerpts from "Limited War: The Prospects and Possibilities," *Army Information Digest*, a special issue on the Army's role in limited war, "Peace or Piecemeal?" Vol. 13, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 6-20.

States, with all its strengths, could not survive a state of siege in a Communist-dominated world. Accordingly, this nation has rejected isolationism in favor of a forward strategy. . . .

The deterrent to the all-out war is not likely to deter limited or disguised aggression because the Soviets are likely to believe that their own nuclear delivery capabilities will deter the West from an all-out response to anything less than a direct challenge. The Soviets may "miscalculate" that they can get away with it.

The danger is that if the only courses of military action open to the West would involve grave risk of expanding hostilities, then the Soviet calculation might prove correct. If the Soviets calculate correctly, the West has been blackmailed into inaction; if the Soviets miscalculate, the West is faced with the all-out war it sought to deter.

The only way out of this dilemma—for the alternatives are unacceptable—is to insure that the free world can muster the forces necessary to defeat aggression wherever it may occur without resort to courses of action which would be likely to bring about all-out war. In other words, the West must be able to deal effectively with limited challenges, employing limited means. . . .

Warfare which is less than total is commonly characterized as limited war. While this term is subject to possible misinterpretation, it has become generally accepted as descriptive of any conflict which is not unlimited from the point of view of the

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Views of the Air Force

by Colonel Thomas L. Fisher II, currently serving with the Directorate of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF. The following excerpts are drawn from his article, "Limited War—What Is It?" *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1957-58), pp. 127-142.

THERE are at least two pressing reasons why the problem of limited wars is of special importance to the Air Force today. The first is that the relative probability of the occurrence of limited wars as compared to total wars is generally considered to be increasing. This reasoning is based on the approaching parity and sufficiency of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the belief that they will continue to deter both sides from risking total war. Because of their growing capacity to neutralize our threat of "massive retaliation" the U.S.S.R. or its allies may feel freer to initiate smaller military adventures. They may decide that they can safely continue to "nibble us to death" because we may be unwilling or unable to take measures that will cause such adventures to cost them more than they will gain.

Air Force and Army

The second reason why limited wars are of current importance to the Air Force lies in a possible national unwillingness or inability to deal effectively with them. Such a possibility stems from our apparent growing dependence on nuclear weapons and the feeling of many people that these may be inappropriate to the small war or that their use may entail excessive risk of expanding the war. Or we may be inhibited from using them by the United Nations or our allies because of the success of Communist propaganda. The USAF is under attack, especially by Army leaders and their supporters, for al-

legedly placing too many of our national eggs in the one basket of nuclear capability and thereby depriving the national military establishment of funds, forces and flexibility to fight all kinds of war by all methods. The Air Force is too much linked in public understanding with the "massive retaliation" policy in terms of SAC's strategic bombing capability. Too little consideration is given to its capability for measured counteraction, or a policy of "graduated deterrence." Thus it is important to the Air Force to recognize and prove its capability to do what is necessary in limited wars. . . .

Although the possible variations in means or methods of carrying on limited war are infinite, we can examine some of their limitations that have been considered probable or desirable. There are two courses of action that will help to impose our will upon the enemy: the denial of resources with which to carry on the war and the inflicting of such punishment that the enemy recognizes the cost not to be worth the possible benefits and so gives up his objectives. . . .

We have suggested two basic methods, denying resources or inflicting punishment, that may be resorted to if we reject both withdrawal and a stalemate armistice. What are the probable limitations on carrying out these courses of action and what range of means may be possible? Here we plunge into the quagmire of generalizing about widely varying situations, the specifics of which must finally determine the answers for any

given limited war situation. Even so perhaps we can identify some of the major questions as to limitations on methods or weapons that have emerged from past discussions.

Choice of Methods

First there is the choice between the two basic methods: the traditional military strategies of blockade, capture or destruction of resources, and the newer atomic-age concept of measured punishment. It is difficult to draw clear lines between them, as one may assist in the other or be a part of it, and both depend on choice of weapons and on political or psychological conditions at the time. The clearest and sharpest current distinctions are drawn by Colonel R. S. Leghorn, whose concept of nuclear punishment tailors the punishment to fit the crime. This is generally parallel to what has come to be called the counterforce strategy and it appears to be gaining adherents and acceptance, especially for limited war. Nuclear punishment would destroy surface forces in the immediate battle zone, permit hot pursuit to destroy on their bases any opposing air forces involved, and destroy nuclear stockpiles at the first instance of their use. It would not bomb cities or population centers unless the enemy started to do so, and it would not blockade or attempt to capture any area. And, most important, it would announce all these restrictions in advance.

Should Nuclear Weapons Be Used?

This first choice cannot really be made until we decide whether we can use nuclear weapons in a limited war. The major argument against such use is the fear that to do so would cause the conflict to expand into total war. Some persons feel that the use of even one nuclear weapon would cause progressive retaliation

and that growth into total war would be uncontrollable. The apparent reasons for such growth would be irrational anger or fear of losing the limited war. But we have seen that Communist doctrine and practice are calculating and flexible; they preach caution and they authorize tactical retreat if this is necessary to live to fight again another day or in another way. The decision to use a nuclear weapon or any particular weapon system would be made by men who ostensibly recognized the desirability of limitation and would not want to spread the war. If the contrary were true, why would they start a limited war in the first place, thus sacrificing their enormous advantage of surprise and giving us an advantage in total war? Since the enemy wanted only limited war, he must be ready to accept our use of nuclear weapons as long as this use is not aimed at his sovereignty or total resources. As to fear of losing the war, if the use of nuclear weapons becomes uncontrolled the enemy will lose far more than a small, limited war. The danger of accidental spread is also cited, but the decision to dispatch atomic bombers against opposing heartlands cannot be accidental. . . .

Still another argument states that the use of nuclear weapons is not moral, that they are "too terrible." This probably is a rationalization based on fear and lack of understanding. Are nuclear weapons any less humane than the flame-throwers, high-explosive shells or massed firebomb raids of the last war? . . .

Can We Afford Not To?

On the other hand, will refusal to use nuclear weapons insure against expansion of the war? It did not keep Communist China out of the Korean War. We can fairly ask, can we afford *not* to use nuclear weapons in any future war? The answer is, only

when we are sure of satisfactory termination of the war at a reasonable cost to us in men, money, and our national security position. In other words, usually only in wars in which the major resources of international communism are not available to the other side. These are the small wars, such as the recent Suez affair, with which this paper is not particularly concerned. There may be political reasons for not using them, as in the Korean War. Such reasons are usually expressed in terms of psychological effect on our allies and neutral nations. These effects are intangible, and the corresponding effects of the courageous use of necessary force toward publicized moral objectives might outweigh them among the millions who understand and respect power. . . .

In summary, a useful definition of limited war against forces of international communism, which we must be prepared to deter or win, might be stated: armed conflict carried on primarily by significant trained military forces in which the sovereignty of the United States and U.S.S.R. are not at stake and the objectives, methods, and area are limited for political or other reasons to less than their potential maximum.

Army

(Continued from page 164)

United States.

Limited wars have limited objectives. In a contest between unmatched powers, however, a war which may appear as limited for one side may very well be an unlimited conflict for the other. An unlimited war, on the other hand, visualizes the complete overthrow of the enemy. In modern war, this would normally require the destruction of the government of the opposing nation.

Probably the most basic truth about war in modern times is that

limited war has been the norm, whereas total war has been the aberration. Considering the disastrous character of World Wars I and II, it is essential to ask: Is there some inexorable logic in human events which makes it inevitable that henceforth any major war will be a total war? On the answer to this question may well rest the fate of civilization. . . .

Preparedness for Limited War

While the all-out assault against the United States is certainly the greatest danger, it is the piecemeal loss of the free world to limited and camouflaged aggression that constitutes the greatest long-term threat to the nation's security. A most basic national objective, therefore, is to insure that the United States security position shall not be so eroded. The nation must be prepared to employ its armed forces, as necessary, in support of this objective. . . .

With limited war the most likely threat to the nation's security, and with the expansion of a limited war the most likely source of an all-out conflict, the capability to wage limited war effectively is the surest guarantee of the nation's security. The deterrent to the all-out war is not enough, for it cannot assuredly deter limited war, and it is not designed for the conduct of limited operations.

The tactical forces necessary for limited war are no less important to the nation's security than maintenance of the strategic deterrent. There must be options open to the free world in resisting Communist aggression—options which lie between inaction on the one hand and actions carrying undue risk of all-out war on the other. In preparing to meet the most overwhelming danger, the lesser danger but more likely threat cannot be neglected. There must be no chink in the armor of deterrence.



Can Anyone Win World Struggle?

According to a world Gallup poll published on June 3, the people of the non-Communist world, as of that date, were in doubt about whether the United States or the U.S.S.R. will be the winner in the East-West power struggle.

The question asked in the major cities of the Western and neutral nations, from Paris and Amsterdam to Athens and New Delhi, was: "Which country in the world will be strongest ten years from now?" The United States and the U.S.S.R. dominated the list of countries mentioned, but neither had a clear edge, and roughly one person in three was undecided about which country in the world would be the strongest a decade hence. Understandably, the American public showed strong confidence in the superiority of the United States, with three out of four questioned across the nation saying that they believed this country would be the strongest power in 1968.

How Will Undecided Decide?

A noteworthy feature of this poll, however, was the high percentage who reported themselves as "undecided." Outside the United States, 29 percent thought this country would be the strongest; 26 percent that the U.S.S.R. would be the strongest; 12 percent put up other candidates; but 33 percent had not made up their minds.

The important question today is how the undecided may decide after the execution of former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy and other leaders of the 1956 Hungarian revolt, which was curtly announced from Moscow on June 17. The immediate reaction around the globe was one of shock

and dismay in the non-Communist countries.

The new government of General de Gaulle officially declared that the execution of the Hungarian rebel leaders "is an act that nothing could justify." The Bonn government stated that it showed the dangers of trying to do business with Communist governments. Italy recalled its minister to Budapest.

Even more significant was the reaction in India, which has carefully tried to avoid commitments to either the Western or the Soviet bloc. A leading newspaper, *The Hindustan Standard*, said editorially: "Why should communism at the height of its power in two continents be afraid of anything and anybody? Yet it apparently is. Of whom? The free man? Of what? The free mind?" And Yugoslavia, which Moscow directly linked to Nagy in its announcement of the execution, expressed the fear that this was a signal for new purges in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and for resumption of a hard policy toward the West.

Nationalism Uncurbed

The Hungarian revolt, with its latest tragic consequences, and Marshal Tito's continued defiance of Russia's efforts to rally Communist-ruled countries to its program, give proof, if it were further needed, that nationalist sentiment is one of the most long-lived, most indestructible human emotions. Neither Western colonialism, nor Communist repression, nor Nazi conquest have long prevailed against it, any more than the Holy Alliance of tsars and emperors in 19th-century Europe prevailed against Hungary's Kossuth,

Italy's Mazzini and Garibaldi, or Verdi's *Aida* and Chopin's *Funeral March*.

This deathless sentiment may prove the Achilles heel of the Soviet empire—not only because of the ferment in Eastern Europe reflected by events in Hungary and Yugoslavia, but also because of the pressure Communist China, not included in preparations for a summit conference (now highly unlikely) appears to have been putting on Moscow. The meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party which opened in Moscow the day the Hungarian executions were announced may shed some light on Russia's future course. If, however, as it now appears, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, although retaining his key role in both the government and the Communist party, has been pushed by conservative elements into abandonment of his previously more flexible policy, then the U.S.S.R. can be expected to lose some of the gains it has made in world opinion since Stalin's death.

West's Dilemmas

Russia's losses, however, may not prove to be gains for the West, unless the Western nations can promptly find answers to their own dilemmas also created by surging nationalism—in Algeria, on the island of Cyprus, in Lebanon.

While General de Gaulle wrestled with the problem of reconciling the interests of 1 million French *colons* and 9 million Muslims in Algeria, Britain faced its gravest crisis in the turbulent history of Cyprus since World War II. There the 400,000 Greeks, on a territory which belonged to Greeks in the days of Byzantium,

demand *enosis*, or union with Greece—a solution which has so far proved wholly unacceptable to the 100,000 Turks on the island, which is only 43 miles from Turkey.

The cause of the Greeks, whose struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire had stirred the emotions of the West in the 1820's and had inspired Lord Byron, is much better understood by Westerners than that of the Turks, who feel that their needs have been neglected and their actions misinterpreted. Turkey fears that Cyprus, if it comes under Greek rule, may some day be used against it militarily. And the Turks on the island, who could accept British rule when it was administered impartially to the Greeks as well as to them, feel that when Greeks—either Cypriotes or mainlanders—take over, they will be reduced to second-class citizenship. The Turks consequently assert that only partition, with Greeks ruling Greeks, and Turks ruling Turks, would be acceptable—a solution rejected by Greece.

Bloody incidents on Cyprus, which have already caused a dangerous rift between Greece and Turkey and weakened NATO, brought reinforcements of British troops, which now number 37,000, including crack paratroopers. This concentration of armed forces has caused observers to sur-

mise that some of them may be destined for action in Lebanon, whose government has asked for the dispatch of United Nations soldiers to prevent the alleged subversion of the country by men and arms from Syria, now an integral part of the United Arab Republic.

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, who on June 19 personally checked UN supervision over Lebanon's border with Syria, may conclude that the use of an armed force is necessary. But should such a force be supplied by Britain, when memories of the Suez invasion are still fresh in the Middle East, or by the United States, which might then be accused of assuming the role for which it denounced Britain, France and Israel in 1956?

Ike Doctrine Changed?

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is believed to have prepared the way for American armed intervention in Lebanon at his May 20 press conference when it seemed to introduce a new interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In its resolution approving the Eisenhower Doctrine Congress had listed four conditions for armed action without its approval in the Middle East: (1) "armed aggression;" which (2) would have to come from a nation "controlled by international commu-

nism;" (3) an appeal for United States aid by the country attacked; and (4) a decision by the President as to whether the three other conditions had been met.

Mr. Dulles, however, seemed to hold the view that the President could take military action even if these conditions did not exist under another clause of the resolution: "The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." Some members of Congress, notably Mike Mansfield, Democrat of Montana, have already challenged this interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine as unwarranted by the intent of Congress when it passed the resolution, as well as by President Eisenhower's previous insistence on the necessity of obtaining Congressional approval for the use of armed forces.

Meanwhile, some observers both here and in Europe fear that American and/or British military intervention in the Middle East, coming at a time when the West has an opportunity to make capital of Russia's actions on Hungary and Yugoslavia, would once more raise questions in the minds of the undecided about the intentions of the West.

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